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Abstract
We describe a class of monetary economies that generate persistent episodes of high
and low inﬂation. In these economies variations in expectations can lead private agents
to take actions which then make it optimal for the monetary authority to validate those
expectations. We think these model economies deserve attention because they display
several good empirical implications.
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1I Introduction
Many countries have gone through prolonged periods of costly, high inﬂation, as well as
prolonged periods of low inﬂation. The United States and other industrialized countries have
experienced relatively low inﬂation while many emerging market economies have experienced
episodes of high inﬂation as well as episodes of low inﬂation. A central question in monetary
economics is why high inﬂation episodes occurred and what can be done to prevent them
from occurring again.
One tradition for understanding poor inﬂation outcomes stems from the time inconsis-
tency literature pioneered by Kydland and Prescott (1978) (KP) and Barro and Gordon (
) (BG). Finite horizon versions of these models do not easily generate the episodes of high
and low inﬂation within countries and the diﬀerent inﬂation experiences across countries.
For example, one possible explanation for the dramatic diﬀerences in inﬂation rates across
countries is that low inﬂation countries can commit to monetary policies, while high inﬂation
countries cannot. This explanation falls afoul of the observation that high inﬂation countries
have prolonged episodes of relatively low inﬂation. Stories that countries periodically can
commit and periodically cannot seem too facile an explanation. Inﬁnite horizon versions of
the KP and BG models have embarrassingly many equilibria, supported by trigger strategies.
It is hard to know what observations would be ruled out by such equilibria.
This paper has two purposes. First, we embed the economic forces in KP and BG into
a standard general equilibrium model and explicitly rule out trigger strategies. Second, we
ﬁnd that in such a model inﬂation rates can be high for prolonged periods of time and low for
prolonged periods of time. We ﬁnd that there is modest support in cross-country evidence
for key implications of the model.
In this paper we examine whether standard monetary general equilibrium models with
benevolent monetary authorities acting under discretion can generate persistent episodes of
high and low inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, we ask whether private agents’ expectations of high or
low inﬂation can lead these agents to take actions which then make it optimal for mone-
tary authorities to validate these expectations. Following Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1998), we call such an outcome an expectation trap. Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1998) showed that expectation traps could occur in conventional general equilibrium mon-
etary models. They relied, however, on trigger strategies on the part of the monetary au-
thority to support such outcomes. One criticism of trigger strategies is that because of folk
theorem-like reasons, virtually any inﬂation outcome can be rationalized as an equilibrium.
Ak e yﬁnding of this paper is that expectation traps can occur, even in the absence of trig-
ger strategies. We think this result deserves attention because it occurs in a model which
has several good empirical implications. As we explain below, the model is potentially able
to resolve a variety of puzzles in the money demand literature. In addition, the model is
consistent with the relative volatility of ﬁnancial and other variables observed in low versus
high inﬂation episodes.
We build on Lucas and Stokey’s (1983) cash-credit good model. In our model, the beneﬁt
of unexpected growth in the money supply is a rise in output and the cost is the misallocation
of resources arising from a distortion in relative prices. The monetary authority optimally
balances the beneﬁt and costs. We obtain the following three results:
• for a large range of parameter values, there are at least two equilibria,
2• there is a sign switch in the correlation of the interest rate with other variables across
high and low inﬂation regimes,
• ﬁnancial variables are more volatile in the high inﬂation equilibrium than in the low
inﬂation equilibrium, while real variables display similar volatility in both equilibria.
We now brieﬂy explain the economic mechanisms in our benchmark model and the in-
tuition underlying our results. In the model, goods are produced in monopolistically com-
petitive markets. The monopoly power of ﬁrms causes the level of economic activity to be
ineﬃciently low. A subset of monopolists set their prices before the monetary authority se-
lects the money growth rate, while the rest of the monopolists set prices afterward. Because
of the preset prices, a monetary expansion greater than expected can raise output. Such a
monetary expansion tends to raise welfare because output is ineﬃciently low. A monetary
expansion also has costs. In our model, some goods must be purchased with previously ac-
cumulated cash. A monetary expansion, by raising prices, reduces the consumption of cash
goods and welfare. In addition, because some prices are preset and others are ﬂexible, a
monetary expansion changes relative prices and induces an ineﬃcient allocation of resources.
These aspects of the model formalize old ideas with an extensive literature.1
We consider two versions of our model. In the ﬁrst, the fraction of goods which are
p u r c h a s e dw i t hc a s hi sh e l dﬁxed. The intuition underlying our second result is that the
marginal cost of unanticipated inﬂation is non-monotone in the expected inﬂation rate. It
turns out that the marginal cost of unexpected inﬂation is roughly proportional to rM/P,
where r is the net nominal interest rate, and M/P denotes real balances. Real balances are
bounded and since the nominal interest rate is increasing in the expected inﬂation rate, it
follows that the marginal cost of unanticipated inﬂation is low at low expected inﬂation. A
key feature of our model is the behavior of money demand at high nominal interest rate.
Speciﬁcally, rM/P goes to zero as r goes to inﬁnity. This feature implies that the marginal
cost of unexpected inﬂation is low at high levels of expected inﬂation. We conjecture that
t h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h em a r g i n a lc o s to fi n ﬂation and rM/P lies in the fact that a
monetary expansion acts as a distorting tax on real balances. Because the marginal cost of
inﬂation has an inverted ‘U’ shape, as in a Laﬀer curve, while the marginal beneﬁt is roughly
constant, there is more than one value of expected inﬂa t i o ni nw h i c ht h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁto f
unanticipated inﬂation equals the marginal cost.
As the reasoning in the previous paragraph suggests, we ﬁnd that the properties of money
demand at high levels of inﬂation are crucial to the question of the multiplicity of equilibria.
We conﬁrm this reasoning by developing a model in which rM/P does not go to zero as r
goes to inﬁnity. In this model we ﬁnd that there is a unique equilibrium.
In the second version of our model, households can also take defensive measures to protect
themselves against expected inﬂation. Speciﬁcally, they can choose the fraction of goods
purchased with cash and the fraction purchased with credit. This choice is made before
the monetary authority chooses its policy. Cash purchases are costly because households
forego interest, while credit purchases require payment of a cost in labor time which diﬀers
depending on the type of good. If households expect high inﬂation, they choose to purchase
most goods with credit and few goods with cash while if they expect low inﬂation they
purchase few goods with credit and most goods with cash.
3This aspect of our model implies that if households expect high inﬂation and have chosen
to purchase most goods with credit, the marginal cost of unanticipated inﬂation is small
because relatively few goods are purchased with cash. The monetary authority has a strong
incentive to inﬂate. If households expect low inﬂation, however, they choose to purchase most
goods with cash and the marginal costs of unanticipated inﬂation are high. The monetary
authority does not have a strong incentive to inﬂate. These arguments suggest that there
might well be multiple equilibria in our model and, indeed, we ﬁnd that for a large range of
parameter values there are two equilibria.
The multiplicity of equilibria in our model raises the possibility of expectation traps. If
private agents expect the monetary authority to pursue an expansionary monetary policy,
they set prices suﬃciently high, and choose to purchase so few goods with cash, that it is
optimal for the monetary authority to validate their expectations. Conversely, if private
agents expect low inﬂation, then the monetary authority optimally validates those expecta-
tions. The possibility of expectation traps in our model is promising because it may help
a c c o u n tf o rt h eo b s e r v e dp r o l o n g e dp e r i o d so fh i g hi n ﬂa t i o na sw e l la sp r o l o n g e dp e r i o d so f
low inﬂation. This possibility depends in a crucial way on the properties of money demand.
At an abstract level, it should not be surprising that the behavior of the monetary author-
ity depends in an essential way on the determinants of demand for the object they supply,
namely money. But, to our knowledge, this connection has not been made as yet in the
literature.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our model. Section 3 analyzes a
restricted version of the model, in which the cash-credit good distinction is exogenous. The
endogenous case is treated in section 4. The ﬁnal section concludes.
II A Cash-Credit Goods Model With Financial Inter-
mediation
In this section, we extend Lucas and Stokey’s (1983) cash-credit-goods model in a number
of ways. Two of our extensions are intended to capture the beneﬁts and costs emphasized in
the literature following KP and BG. In our model, a subset of prices are set in advance by
monopolistic ﬁrms. This feature implies that an unanticipated monetary expansion tends to
raise output and welfare, as in KP and BG. We adopt the timing assumption in Svensson (
) by requiring that households use currency accumulated in the previous period to purchase
cash goods. This timing assumption implies that a realization of high inﬂation reduces the
consumption of cash goods relative to credit goods and thereby tends to reduce welfare. Our
third extension is intended to capture the idea that when people expect high inﬂation, they
adopt defensive mechanisms to protect themselves. Speciﬁcally, in our model each good can
be paid for either with cash or with credit. To purchase any good with credit requires a
payment of an intermediation cost, which varies across goods. For each good, households
trade oﬀ the foregone interest from using cash against the intermediation cost. When the
inﬂation rate and the interest rate are expected to be high, households protect themselves
by opting to purchase a relatively large number of goods on credit.2
4Our inﬁnite-horizon economy is composed of a continuum of ﬁrms, a representative house-
hold and a monetary authority. The sequence of events within a period is as follows. First,
the shocks are realized. These are a shock to the production technology, θ, to government
consumption, g, and to the payments technology, η. We refer to s =( θ,g,η) as the exogenous
state, and we assume that s follows a Markov process. Then households choose the fraction,
z, of goods to purchase with cash, and a fraction µ of ﬁrms (the ‘sticky price ﬁrms’) set their
prices. These decisions depend on the exogenous state. Let Z(s) denote the economy-wide
average value of z and Pe(s) denote the average price set by sticky price ﬁrms. Here, and
in what follows, we scale all nominal variables by the beginning-of-period aggregate stock of
money.
After that, the monetary authority makes its policy decision. We denote the actual money
growth rate by x and the policy rule that the monetary authority is expected to follow by
X(s). The state of the economy after the monetary authority makes its decision, the private
sector’s state, is (s,x). Households’ and ﬁrms’ production, consumption and employment
decisions depend on the private sector’s state.
Notice that we do not include the beginning-of-period aggregate stock of money in either
of our states. In our economy, all equilibria are neutral in the usual sense that if the initial
money stock is doubled, there is an equilibrium in which real allocations and the interest rate
are unaﬀected and all nominal variables are doubled. This consideration leads us to focus
on equilibria which are invariant with respect to the initial money stock. We are certainly
mindful of the possibility that there can be equilibria which depend on the money stock.
For example, if there are multiple equilibria in our sense, it is possible to construct ‘trigger
strategy-type’ equilibria which are functions of the initial money stock. In our analysis we
exclude such equilibria and we normalize the aggregate stock of money at the beginning of
each period to unity.
As is customary in deﬁning a Markov equilibrium, we begin with the decisions at the
end of the period, and work our way back to the beginning of the period. Accordingly, we
ﬁrst describe the end-of-period problem of households and ﬂexible price ﬁrms given (s,x)
and future monetary policy, X(s). We then describe the problem of sticky price ﬁrms and
t h eh o u s e h o l d ’ sc h o i c eo fz. These problems and market clearing allow us to deﬁne a private
sector equilibrium for arbitrary x. We then describe the monetary authority’s problem and
deﬁne a Markov equilibrium.
A Private Sector at the End of the Period
In this section we discuss the decision problems of households and ﬁrms at the end of the
period. We begin with the household problem. In each period the household consumes a
continuum of diﬀerentiated goods as in Blanchard and Kiyotaki ( ) and supplies labor. The


















ct(ω) denotes consumption of type ω good, lt denotes labor time, and 0 < ρ < 1.
Each good in this continuum is one of four types. A fraction µ are produced by sticky price
ﬁrms and a fraction 1−µ are produced by ﬂexible price ﬁrms. The sticky and ﬂexible price
ﬁrms are randomly distributed over the goods. In addition, each good can be purchased with
cash or with credit. Let z denote the fraction of goods the household chooses to purchase with
cash. This cash-credit decision is made before households know which goods are produced
by sticky or ﬂexible price ﬁrms, so that the cash-credit good choice is independent of the
type of ﬁrm. Thus, a fraction µz of goods are sticky price goods purchased with cash, a
fraction (1 −µ)z are ﬂexible price goods purchased with cash, a fraction µ(1−z) are sticky
price goods purchased with credit and a fraction (1 − µ)(1 − z) are ﬂexible price goods
purchased with credit. It turns out that prices for goods within each type are the same.
Utility maximization implies that the amounts purchased of each type of good are the same.
Let c11 and c12 denote quantities of cash goods purchased from sticky and ﬂexible price ﬁrms,
respectively, and let c21 and c22 denote the quantities of credit goods purchased from sticky
and ﬂexible price goods, respectively. Then we have that
c =[ zµc
ρ
11 + z(1 − µ)c
ρ
12 +( 1− z)µc
ρ





The household divides its labor time, l, into time supplied to goods-producing ﬁrms, n,
and time devoted to the payments technology according to:
l = n +
η(¯ z − z)1+ν
1+ν
. (3)
We discuss the determination of z below.
Let A denote the nominal assets of the household, carried over from the previous period.
In the asset market, the household divides A into money holdings, M, and bonds, B, subject
to
M + B ≤ A. (4)
Recall that nominal assets, money and bonds are all scaled by the aggregate stock of money.
We impose a no-Ponzi constraint of the form B ≤ ¯ B, where ¯ B is a large, ﬁnite, upper bound.




e(s)µzc11 + ˆ P(s,x)(1 − µ)zc12
i
≥ 0, (5)
where Pe(s) denotes the price set by sticky price ﬁrms and ˆ P(s,x) denotes the price set by
ﬂexible price ﬁrms. Nominal assets evolve over time as follows:
0 ≤ W(s,x)n +( 1− R(s,x))M − z
h
P






e(s)µc21 + ˆ P(s,x)(1 − µ)c22
i
+ R(s,x)A +( x − 1) + D(s,x) − xA
0.
6In (6), W(s,x) denotes the nominal wage rate, R(s,x) denotes the gross nominal rate of
return on bonds, and D(s,x) denotes proﬁts after lump sum taxes. Finally, B has been
substituted out in the asset equation using (4). Notice that A0 is multiplied by x. This
multiplication reﬂects the way we have scaled the stock of nominal assets.
Consider the household’s asset, goods and labor market decisions for a given value of
z. Given that the household expects, in the future the monetary authority to choose policy
according to X(s), prices to be set according to Pe(s) and cash credit goods decisions to be
made according to Z(s), the household solves the following problem:








subject to (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and non-negativity on allocations. The solution to (7) yields




We turn now to the decision problems of ﬁrms at the end of the period. Each of the
diﬀerentiated goods is produced by a monopolist using the following production technology:
y(ω)=θn(ω),
where y(ω) denotes output and n(ω) denotes employment for type ω good. Also, θ is a
technology shock that is the same for all goods. The household’s problem yields demand
curves for each good. The fraction, 1−µ,o fﬁrms that are ﬂexible price ﬁrms set their price,
ˆ P(s,x), to maximize proﬁts subject to these demand curves. Because the household demand
curves have constant elasticity, ﬁrms set prices as a ﬁxed markup, 1/ρ, above marginal cost,





Turning to the government, we assume that there is no government debt, government
consumption is ﬁnanced with lump sum taxes, and government consumption is the same for
all goods. As a result, the resource constraint for this economy is:
θn = g + z [µc11 +( 1− µ)c12]+( 1− z)[µc21 +( 1− µ)c22]. (10)
Since there is no government debt, bond market clearing requires B =0 ,A=1 . Also, money
market clearing requires M =1 .
B Private Sector at the Beginning of the Period
A tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h ep e r i o d ,a f t e rt h ee x o g e n o u ss h o c k sa r er e a l i z e d ,s t i c k yp r i c eﬁrms
set prices and households make their payment technology decision, z.
7As in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (19xx), sticky price ﬁrms in our economy must set their
price in advance and must produce the amount demanded at that price. These ﬁrms, like
the ﬂexible price ﬁrms, also wish to set their price as a markup, 1/ρ, over marginal cost,
W/θ. In order to do so, they need to forecast the wage rate, W. They do so by taking the
wage rate as given by the private sector equilibrium. Thus, the wage they expect to prevail
is W(s,X(s)), where Pe(s) denotes the average price set by other sticky price ﬁrms. Thus,






We now discuss the household’s payment technology decision. As noted above, each
consumption good can be purchased either with cash or with credit. For goods with ω >
¯ z, (where ¯ z is a parameter between 0 and 1) ,t h ec o s to fp u r c h a s i n gw i t hc r e d i ti sz e r o .
Purchasing goods with ω ≤ ¯ z on credit requires labor time. The household chooses a
fraction, z ≤ ¯ z, such that goods with ω <zare purchased with cash and goods with ω >z
are purchased with credit. The labor time required to purchase fraction, z, of goods with
cash is given by η(¯ z − z)1+ν/(1 + ν),w h e r eν > 0 is a parameter and η > 0 is the shock to
the payment technology. The household’s labor time, including time spent working in the
market, n, is given in (3). The household chooses z to solve the following problem:
z(A,s)=a r gm a x
0≤z≤¯ z
v(A,z,s,X(s)). (12)
We now deﬁne an equilibrium for each possible private sector state, (s,x), and future
monetary policy rule, X(s).
Deﬁnition For each s and each x, given X(s) a private sector equilibrium is a collection of
functions, Pe(s),Z (s), ˆ P(s,x),W(s,x),R (s,x),v (A,z,s,x),d (A,z,s,x),z (A,s) such that:
1. The functions v and d solve (7), where d is deﬁned in (8),
2. The function, z(A,s) solves (12) and z(1,s)=Z(s),
3. Firms maximize proﬁts, i.e., ˆ P(s,x) satisﬁes (9) and Pe(s) satisﬁes (11),
4. The resource constraint is satisﬁed, for d(1,Z(s),s,x).
5. The asset markets clear, i.e., A0(1,s,x)=M(1,s,x)=1 .
We ﬁnd it convenient to deﬁne another private sector equilibrium concept. A private
sector equilibrium with a ﬁxed payment technology is a private sector equilibrium with the
restriction that z is ﬁxed and is not a choice variable.
8C Monetary Authority




where v is the value function in a private sector equilibrium. Recall that a private sector
equilibrium takes as given the evolution of future monetary policy. Thus, in solving (13) the
monetary authority implicitly takes as given the evolution of future monetary policy.
D Markov Equilibrium
We now have the ingredients needed to deﬁne a Markov equilibrium.
Deﬁnition A Markov equilibrium is a private sector equilibrium and a monetary policy rule,
X(s), such that X(s) solves (13).
Two properties of a Markov equilibrium deserve emphasis. First, the current money
growth rate does not aﬀect discounted utility of the household starting from the next period
since it does not aﬀect next period’s state. Therefore, the monetary authority faces the static
problem of maximizing current period utility and we only have to describe how current
money growth aﬀects current allocations. Second, inspection of (9) and (11) shows that
ˆ P(s,X(s)) = Pe(s) in a Markov equilibrium. We use these properties below.
In our analysis of Markov equilibrium, we ﬁnd it convenient to deﬁne another Markov
equilibrium concept. The Markov equilibrium with a ﬁxed payment technology is a Markov
equilibrium in which the private sector equilibrium is a private sector equilibrium in which
z is exogenously ﬁxed, and beyond the control of agents.
III Analysis with Fixed Payment Technology
In this section we discuss a version of our model in which the payment technology is ﬁxed,
in the sense that households cannot alter the value of z.W ed ot h i sf o rt w or e a s o n s .F i r s t ,
understanding the properties of this version of the model helps us develop the properties
of the model when z is chosen by households. Second, as mentioned in the introduction,
the model with a ﬁxed payment technology is the simplest adaption of a standard monetary
model designed to capture the frictions emphasized in KP and BG.
To analyze our model, we decompose the ﬁrst order condition associated with the mon-
etary authority problem, (13), into beneﬁts and costs of inﬂation. In our model unexpected
inﬂation has beneﬁts because some prices are sticky and there is a monopoly distortion.
Under sticky prices, higher inﬂation tends to raise output, while the monopoly distortion
makes higher output desirable. These are the reasons the monetary authority in our model
has a temptation to stimulate the economy. In our model, inﬂation also has costs because
it leads to a reduction in the relative consumption of cash good. In addition, unexpected
9inﬂation also leads to a misallocation of resources because some prices are ﬁxed in advance,
while others are not.
To analyze a Markov equilibrium we ﬁrst characterize a private sector equilibrium. We
then solve the monetary authority’s problem.
A Characterizing Private Sector Equilibrium
We now develop a set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a private sector equilibrium.































where q = ˆ P/Pe and z is ﬁxed. Here, uij denotes the partial derivative of u with respect to
cij, and v1 denotes the partial derivative of v with respect to its ﬁrst argument. In the labor
Euler equation, we have used (9).
In addition, the cash in advance constraint can be written as
P
eµzc11 + qP
e(1 − µ)zc12 ≤ 1.
It is easy to show that if R>1, the cash in advance constraint holds with equality and if the
cash in advance constraint is slack, R =1 . These observations imply that the appropriate
complementary slackness condition is
{1 − [P
eµzc11 + qP
e(1 − µ)zc12]}[R − 1] = 0. (15)
T h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n ti s :
g + z [µc11 +( 1− µ)c12]+( 1− z)[µc21 +( 1− µ)c22]=θn. (16)
Combining (9) and (11) we have that
P
e(s)= ˆ P(s,X(s)). (17)
In this last equation we reintroduce the dependence of variables on s and x to emphasize
that Pe coincides with ˆ P only when x = X(s). The conditions in (14), (15), (16) and (17)
are necessary and suﬃcient for a private sector equilibrium.
10It is useful to sketch how one might use this characterization result to compute the
objects in a private sector equilibrium for given X(s). Pick a particular value of s, say ˜ s.
Set ¯ x = X(˜ s). P o s i tav a l u ef o rPe(˜ s). Solve the 7 independent equations provided by (14),
(15), and (16) for the seven variables: ˆ P(¯ x, ˜ s),c ij(¯ x, ˜ s),R (¯ x, ˜ s) and n(¯ x, ˜ s).3 Adjust Pe(˜ s)
until (17) is satisﬁe d . T h i si st h ep r i v a t ee c o n o m yv a l u eo fPe given s =˜ s. Now consider
the range of alternative possible values of x. In each case, solve for ˆ P(x, ˜ s),c ij(x, ˜ s),R (x, ˜ s)
and n(x, ˜ s) using the 7 equations, (14), (15), and (16) and holding Pe to its private economy
equilibrium value. This procedure yields the private economy equilibrium value of Pe(˜ s)
and the functions, ˆ P, c ij,Rand n, for ﬁxed s =˜ s. By repeating these calculations for the
entire range of values of s, we obtain the private economy equilibrium functions, evaluated at
A =1 . This is suﬃcient for our purposes. Our ultimate interest lies in identifying a Markov
e q u i l i b r i u m ,a n dt h i sd o e sn o tr e q u i r ee v a l u a t i n gt h ep r i v a t ee c o n o m yf u n c t i o n sf o rA 6=1 .
Notice that the heart of the previous algorithm involves solving the 7 equations, (14), (15),
and (16), for ˆ P,cij,Rand n, conditional on values for s, x, and Pe. These equations have a
recursive structure which allows us to drop one unknown and one equation, if we change the
choice variable of the monetary authority. In particular, we posit that the variable chosen by
the monetary authority is q = ˆ P/Pe rather than x. This does not substantively change the
nature of the monetary authority problem because there is a monotone relationship between
ˆ P and x.4 With this change, the roles of x and ˆ P are reversed in the above algorithm.
The algorithm becomes one of solving the 7 equations indicated above for x, cij,Rand n
conditional on values for s, q, and Pe. Notice that x only appears in the last equation in
(14), so that cij,Rand n c a nb ec o m p u t e da sf u n c t i o n so fs, Pe, q, and x c a nb es o l v e df o r
at the last stage. For later reference, it is useful to write these functions out explicitly
cij(s,P
e,q),i , j=1 ,2,R (s,P
e,q),n (s,P
e,q). (18)
Given the change in the monetary authority’s choice variable, for purposes of identifying
a Markov equilibrium it is not necessary to solve for x. As a result, the change in choice
variable allows us to drop one equation and one unknown. Moreover, note that the only
place where future monetary policy enters is through the last equation in (14). Thus, the
change in choice variable also allows us to ignore future monetary policy, X(s).W ed e n o t e
the set, (s,P e,q), for which there exists a private sector equilibrium by D.5
B Markov Equilibrium











11Let q(s) denote the solution to this problem. A Markov equilibrium has the property that
q(s)=1for all s. Our analysis is based on the ﬁrst order necessary condition associated with
(19). In the computational examples we verify suﬃcient conditions numerically.
Monetary authority optimality implies that, in equilibrium6:
Uq(s,P
e,1) = uccq + unnq =0 , (20)
where Uq is the derivative of U with respect to q. In addition, uc,u n are derivatives of the
utility function with respect to c and n, respectively, and cq,n q are the derivatives of c and n
with respect to q. In (20) these derivatives are evaluated at q =1 . From here on we suppress
the arguments of functions, and evaluate all functions at q =1 . In what follows, we show
how (20) can be decomposed into a part that reﬂects the gains of unexpected inﬂation (i.e.,
raising q above unity) arising from the presence of monopoly power and the costs associated
with price distortions.
In equilibrium, c11 = c12 = c1, say, and c21 = c22 = c2, say. Rewrite the expression for Uq
by adding and subtracting θu22nq/[(1 − µ)(1 − z)]:
Uq = uccq −
θu22nq





(1 − µ)(1 − z)
¸
nq =0 . (21)




(1 − µ)(1 − z)
= −
θu22
(1 − µ)(1 − z)
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½













Notice that if the government could commit itself to monetary policy, it would follow the
Friedman rule and set R =1 , so that the ﬁrst term in braces would be zero. In light of this
observation, we call this term the inﬂation distortion. We call the second term in braces
the monopoly distortion for the following reason. In the eﬃcient allocations for our model
economy, the marginal rate of substitution between credit good consumption and leisure
would be set equal to the marginal product of labor, and the second term would be zero.
It is useful to simplify the expressions in (22). From (14) we have
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12In the appendix, we show that nqθ(1 − ρ)/c2 is a function of c1/c2. Using our functional

























Thus, ψID is the inﬂation distortion and ψMD is the monopoly distortion. Our decomposition
of the monetary authority’s ﬁrst order condition is:
Uq =
u22c2













A c1/c2 ∈ [0,1] satisﬁes the necessary condition for a Markov equilibrium if it sets Uq =0 .
Here, c1/c2 =0corresponds to (inﬁnitely) high R and inﬂation, and c1/c2 =1corresponds
to R =1and low inﬂation.
Consider the inﬂation distortion function, ψID. From inspection of (23), it is immediate
that
ψID(0) = ψID(1) = 0.
That is, there is no inﬂation distortion when expected inﬂation rates are high or low. This
feature of the model plays an important role in generating a multiplicity of Markov equilibria.
In the appendix, we establish that ψMD(0) > 0. Therefore, Uq > 0 at c1/c2 =0 . Suppose
next that ψMD(1) > 0. Then, Uq > 0 at c1/c2 =1 . With one exception, by continuity of
Uq there are at least two values of c1/c2 such that Uq =0 . The exceptional case occurs
when the graph of Uq is tangent to the horizontal axis. This case is clearly non-generic. We
have established that if ψMD(1) > 0, there are generically two allocations which satisfy the
necessary conditions for equilibrium, if there are any.
Suppose next that ψMD(1) < 0. Then, Uq < 0 at c1/c2 =1 . By continuity of Uq there is
at least one value of c1/c2 < 1 such that Uq =0 . This value satisﬁes the necessary conditions
for an equilibrium.
N e x t ,w es h o wt h a ti fψMD(1) < 0, then c1/c2 =1satisﬁes the necessary conditions
for an equilibrium. We do this by examining the behavior of Uq when c1/c2 =1 . In this
case, the allocation functions are not diﬀerentiable functions of q. The problem is, as we
show in the appendix, that for q>1 the cash in advance constraint is binding, while it
is not binding for q<1. The allocation functions are diﬀerent in the two cases because
the equations characterizing a private sector equilibrium are diﬀerent.7 When the cash in
advance constraint is not binding, we replace it by R =1in (28).
In the appendix, we establish that the right derivative of U with respect to q,d e n o t e d
by Uq↓1, is identical to (22). We also establish that the left derivative of U, denoted by Uq↑1,
is strictly positive.
These observations imply that a necessary condition for R =1to be a Markov equilibrium
is that the right derivative of U be non-positive. That is, ψMD(1) ≤ 0. To see this, notice
that, when the right derivative of U is non-positive, the monetary authority has no incentive
to raise q. Since the left derivative is strictly positive, the authority also has no incentive to
reduce q.
13We have established:
Proposition 1: Suppose the ﬁrst order conditions for an equilibrium are suﬃcient. Then,
generically, there are at least two Markov equilibria with a ﬁxed payment technology.
Next, we show that, in a Markov equilibrium with a ﬁxed payment technology, the
equilibrium interest rate is constant.
Proposition 2: In a Markov equilibrium with a ﬁxed payment technology, the interest
rate, R, d o e sn o td e p e n do nt h er e a l i z a t i o no ft h et e c h n o l o g ys h o c k ,θ, and of government
consumption, g.
Proof: Notice from (23) that ψID does not depend on θ or g. This is true of ψMD as
well (see (37) and (39)). Thus, c1/c2 does not depend on θ or g. The result follows because
R =( c2/c1)1−ρ (see (28)).
In this subsection we have argued that multiple equilibria are possible in our model. The
proof of Proposition 1 suggests that the multiplicity arises because of the Laﬀer Curve shape
of the inﬂation distortion function, ψID. T h i ss h a p ei nt u r nd e p e n d so n(R − 1)M/P going
to zero as the interest rate R goes to inﬁnity. That is, it depends on money demand being
suﬃciently elastic with respect to the interest rate. One conjecture is that if money demand
is not very elastic, then the equilibrium is unique. In the Appendix, we develop a model in
which rM/P d o e sn o tg ot oz e r oa sr goes to inﬁnity. In this model we ﬁnd that there is a
unique equilibrium.
C Numerical Examples
To illustrate the results in Proposition 1, we constructed two deterministic examples. We
obtained parameter values for the baseline example as follows. Some of the parameters are
obtained from the money demand relationship in our model. To develop this relationship,
denote private purchases of consumption goods by
c
p = zc1 +( 1− z)c2.
Notice this is the value of consumption goods purchased in markets by the households in
the model since both cash and credit goods sell for the same price. Using (28) and that
zc1 = M/P from the cash in advance constraint, we have that, in a Markov equilibrium, the









This relationship can be interpreted as a money demand equation. We regressed log(Pc p/M−
1) on logR and a constant. Under the appropriate orthogonality condition on the regression,
the parameters z and ρ can be obtained from the least squares estimates. Based on this
results of this procedure, we set z =¯ z =0 .182 and ρ =0 .643.8 From Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) we obtained an estimate of ψ =4 . We used a value of µ =0 .1, which
is somewhat higher than results reported in Parks.9 We set g =0 .05, so that government
14consumption, as a fraction of output, is roughly consistent with what it is in the data.
Finally, we normalized θ =1 .
Figure 1 displays the monopoly distortion, ψMD, and the inﬂation distortion, ψID, for
c1/c2 ∈ (0,1). An equilibrium value of c1/c2 is one for which the two are equal or, c1/c2 =1
and ψMD ≤ 0. In this example, the necessary conditions for an optimum are satisﬁed at R =
1.20 and R =1 .56. The candidate low inﬂation equilibrium corresponds to Pe = ˆ P =6 5 ,
and the candidate high inﬂation equilibrium corresponds to Pe = ˆ P =1 3 0 . Recall that these
prices are scaled by the beginning of period aggregate stock of money. So, the low inﬂation
equilibrium corresponds to the low price (i.e., high real balances) and the high inﬂation
equilibrium corresponds to the high price.






































Fig. 1: Marginal Costs and Benefits of Unexpected Inflation
θ = 1,   µ = 0.1,   ρ = 0.643,    ψ = 4, z = 0.182, g = 0.05
R = 1.56
R = 1.20
To verify that these are in fact equilibria, we need to conﬁrm that, in each case, ˆ P = Pe
in fact solves the monetary authority’s problem, (19). Doing so is also instructive because it
makes possible examining the costs and beneﬁts of unanticipated inﬂa t i o ni ne a c hc a s e .t h e
monetary authority is choosing the optimal value of ˆ P in each case. Figure 2 displays the
impact on cij,c ,n ,R ,and utility of variations in ˆ P over the range, [0,500] when Pe takes
on its value in the candidate low inﬂation equilibrium. The star in the ﬁgure markes the
candidate equilibrium identiﬁed in Figure 1. There are several things worth noting in this
ﬁgure. First, note that utility is maximized at the conjectured equilibrium. Thus, it indeed
is an equilibrium. Second, note how employment increases with unexpected inﬂation. Note,
too, how the consumption of ﬂexible price goods (c12, and c22) drops, as their price rises
with an unexpected inﬂation. Finally, note the lack of diﬀerentiability in the private sector’s
response to ˆ P as ˆ P drops below the point where R =1 .10
















































Figure 2: Consequences of Deviation in Low Inflation Equilibrium







N e x t ,w ee x a m i n et h er e s p o n s eo ft h ep r i v a t ee c o n o m yt o ˆ P 6= Pe when Pe takes on its
value in the candidate high inﬂation equilibrium. The results are displayed in Figure 3 and
are similar to those in Figure 2. In particular, it is evident that utility in fact is maximized
at ˆ P = Pe, so that this is indeed an equilibrium.
















































Figure 3: Consequences of Deviation in High Inflation Equilibrium







We considered a second example, which illustrates two interesting possibilities. For this
example, we simply increased z and ¯ z to 0.3. The inﬂation and monopoly distortion curves
are presented in Figure 4. Notice that in this example, the monopoly distortion is negative
17for c1/c2 =1 . Thus, the Ramsey allocations are a Markov equilibrium.







































Fig. 4: Marginal Costs and Benefits of Unexpected Inflation
θ = 1,  µ = 0.1,  ρ = 0.643,  ψ = 4, z = 0.3, g = 0.05
R = 2.90
Notice too, that there is a candidate high inﬂation equilibrium, with R =2 .90. Here, Pe =
368. To determine if this is actually an equilibrium, we investigate whether ˆ P = Pe is a
global maximum. Figure 5 displays the family of private sector equilibria associated with
ˆ P ∈ [0,500]. The ‘star’ in the ﬁgure indicates the candidate equilibrium. Note that while
ˆ P = Pe is a local maximum, it is not a global maximum. The global maximum, indicated
by a circle in the ﬁgure, is at ˆ P =2 5 . We conclude that in this example, there is a unique
Markov equilibrium, and that the inﬂation bias in that equilibrium is zero. This ﬁnding is
18consistent with Proposition 1, since the condition of that proposition is not satisﬁed.














































Figure 5: Consequences of Deviation in High Inflation Equilibrium







In the following section, we endogenize the variable, z. For this, it is convenient to
summarize the Markov equilibria associated with each ﬁxed z. We do this by exploiting the
fact that for each ﬁxed c1/c2 ∈ [0,1] there is either no value of z that sets Uq =0in (24), or
exactly one. We identiﬁed a range of values of c1/c2 w h e r et h ev a l u eo fz that sets Uq =0
satisﬁes z ≤ ¯ z =0 .182. For each of these c1/c2, we computed z. We veriﬁed numerically
that each z,(c1/c2) combination obtained in this way satisﬁes the suﬃcient conditions for a
Markov equilibrium.11 Figure 6 displays the results. There, we report R =( c2/c1)1−ρ, rather
than c1/c2. Note how the collection of z, R that represent Markov equilibria are characterized
by a ‘horsehoe’ shape. For each z lying in an interval beginning for z al i t t l eb e l o w0.176
and extending to ¯ z, there are two Markov equilibria.











Figure 6: Markov Equilibria Corresponding to Various Values of z
z
R
IV Analysis with Variable Payment Technology
We now turn to the full model, in which the payments technology is determined endogenously.
The analysis of the previous section is a basic building block. The R,z combinations that
satisfy Uq =0 ,w h e r eUq is deﬁned in (24), summarize the implications of monetary authority
optimization, the Markov equilibrium condition and private economy equilibrium for given
z (we refer to c1/c2 and R interchangeably, since there is a monotone relationship, R =
(c2/c1)
1−ρ , between them). Equation (24) implicitly deﬁnes a function (correspondence,
actually) mapping from the private payment technology decision (see the horizontal axis
in Figure 6) into the monetary policy’s choice, here characterized in terms of R (see the
vertical axis). Loosely, we can think of this as the monetary authority’s response, given the
payment technology, z. To analyze the full model, we need to take into account the fact that
z is actually chosen by households. Their ﬁrst order condition for z, together with other
equations that must hold in a private sector equilibrium, deﬁne a function mapping R into
z. We can think of this equation as the private sector’s response, given anticipated policy, R.
The reason for the adjective, anticipated, of course, is that the household chooses z before
monetary policy is realized. The intersection of these two response functions is a Markov
equilibrium for our economy.
In the ﬁrst subsection below, we derive the private sector’s best response function. The
following subsection analyzes the full model. That section notes that if technology shocks
20dominate in the model, then it predicts that in a high inﬂation equilibrium the interest
rate should be negatively correlated with output while it should be positively correlated
with output in a low inﬂation equilibrium. The ﬁnal section presents cross-country evidence
which provides modest support for this implication.
A Implications of Optimal Payment Technology Choice
The ﬁrst order condition associated with the household’s optimal choice of the fraction of







z +( 1− z)(c2/c1)ρ =
ψη(¯ z − z)ν
1 − n − (¯ z − z)1+νη/(1 + ν)
. (25)
The right side corresponds to the gain, in terms of time released from operating the transac-
tions technology, that occurs when there is a marginal increase in z. T h el e f ts i d es u m m a r i z e s
costs. First, there is a drop in the consumption of the goods which are converted into cash
goods with a rise in z, as long as R>1. This drop gives rise to a fall in utility. Second, the
increased consumption of cash goods associated with a rise in z tightens the cash in advance
constraint, (5), which is costly when R>1. This cost is partially oﬀset by the impact on
the household asset evolution equation, (6), of the fact that total expenditures on goods
falls with an increase in z when R>1. T h ec o n s i d e r a t i o n sh a v i n gt od ow i t ht h ei m p a c t
on the cash in advance constraint and on the asset evolution equation of an increase in z
are captured by Lagrange multipliers, which have already been substituted out from the left
side of (25).
It is easy to verify that for each ﬁxed R ≥ 1 and n, t h e r ei sa tm o s to n ev a l u eo fz
that satisﬁes (25). This can be seen by noting that the term on the left of the equality is
non-decreasing, while the term on the right is decreasing, in z. Similarly, as R increases, z
falls. This can be seen by noting that the expression on the left of the equality in (25) rises,
while the expression on the right remains unchanged, with a rise in R. The intuition here
is simple. When R increases, purchasing goods with cash is increasingly costly because it
entails foregone interest. Thus, with R high households ﬁnd it optimal to purchase more
goods on credit.
But, this analysis is insuﬃcient because it presumes n in (25) is constant, while n can
be expected to change with R.I fn fell with a rise in R, then the reasoning in the previous
paragraph suggesting that higher R is associated with lower z, is reinforced. However, it
appears diﬃcult to establish rigorously that increases in R always lead to a fall in n. Still,
by substituting out for n in (25) using the household ﬁrst order condition for labor and the
resource constraint, it is possible to establish that higher R leads to lower z. We do this now.
Evaluating the labor ﬁrst order condition in (14) and using our functional forms, we
obtain:
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z +( 1− z)(c2/c1)ρ =




This is not yet a relationship in terms of R and z only, because of the presence of c2 in
the denominator on the right hand side. However, combining the resource constraint, θn =
zc1 +( 1− z)c2 + g, with (26) yields an expression for c2 in terms of c1/c2 which, when







z +( 1− z)(c2/c1)ρ =





























































For each ﬁxed R t h e r ei sa tm o s to n ez that solves this expression. To see this, note that
t h el e f th a n ds i d ei si n c r e a s i n gi nz for R ≥ 1, while the right hand side is decreasing. In
addition, z is decreasing as R increases. This can be seen by noting that the left side of the
above expression is increasing in R. Thus, taking into account the endogeneity of n does not
overturn the intuition underlying the negative relationship between R and z described for
(25). With higher R, households optimally choose smaller z. This mapping from R to z is
what we have called the private sector’s response to anticipated policy.
It is easy to use (27) to deduce the impact on the private sector response of shocks. An
increase in g/θ or η shifts the right side of the equality up and so increases z for ﬁxed R.
B Markov Equilibrium with Variable Payment Technology
Figure 7 displays the private sector and monetary authority response functions, for various
values of the exogenous shocks. The monetary authority response function is simply taken
from Figure 6. Note how the private sector response is downward-sloped, consistent with the
analysis in the previous subsection. As suggested in the analysis in the previous subsection,
the private sector response shifts with shocks. At the same time, consistent with Proposition
222, the monetary authority response does not respond to shocks.
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Figure 7: Markov Equilibrium With Variable Payment Technology and Shocks












mean    η
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η - .005
For each realization of the shocks, the private sector and monetary authority responses
intersect twice. Thus, there are two Markov equilibria. In the low interest rate Markov
equilibrium households expect the monetary authority to pursue a low inﬂation policy and
choose to purchase a large fraction of goods with cash. The monetary authority, confronted
with households who have chosen to purchase a large fraction of goods with cash ﬁnds
that the marginal cost of inﬂation is high since a large fraction of goods are purchased
with cash. Conversely, in the high interest rate Markov equilibrium, households expect the
monetary authority to pursue a high inﬂation policy and choose to purchase a small fraction
of goods with cash. The monetary authority, confronted with households who have chosen
to purchase a small fraction of goods with cash, ﬁnds that the marginal cost of inﬂation is
low and optimally chooses a relatively high inﬂation rate.
An interesting feature of our model is that the correlation between R and z switches sign
for a given shock, depending whether the economy is in a high inﬂation or a low inﬂation
equilibrium. Thus, in the low inﬂation equilibrium interest rates are relatively high when
the technology shock is relatively high. In contrast, in the high inﬂation equilibrium, inter-
est rates are relatively low when the technology shock is relatively high. Output in both
equilibria is increasing in the size of the technology shock. Thus, the model displays the fea-
ture that in the low inﬂation equilibrium the correlation between output and the interest is
positive, while in the high inﬂation equilibrium this correlation is negative. The precise sign
of the correlation in each equilibrium depends upon the relative sizes of the shocks and their
covariances. In this sense, the theory does not impose sharp implications for all stochastic
processes generating shocks. Nevertheless, we would expect that if the technology shock
23were relatively more important than the others, the correlation between output and interest
rates would be higher in the low inﬂation equilibrium than in the high inﬂation equilibrium.
C A Modest Comparison with the Cross-Country Data
This implication of the model motivates looking at the interest rate, output correlations
in the data. For this, we examined data on a cross-section of countries. In particular,
we examined annual data from two kinds of countries: those with high inﬂation and those
with low inﬂation.13 We deﬁned high inﬂation countries as those with interest rates that
exceed 100 percent in at least one year during the sample for which we have data, and low
inﬂation countries as a subset of OECD countries. We excluded transition economies of
Eastern Europe from our sample. In each case, data on output and short-term interest rates
were taken from the International Monetary Fund’s IFS data base. The output data were
logged, and then Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered. The interest rate data are denominated in annual
percentage point terms. These were simply Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered.14
Table 1 reports correlations for the high inﬂation countries in our sample. In most
cases these countries experienced periods of very high inﬂation and periods of relatively low
inﬂation. We deﬁne periods of high inﬂation to be periods when the nominal interest rate
exceeds 50 percent per year, while the other periods are periods of low inﬂation. Fortunately,
these periods turned out - with minor exceptions - to be contiguous. As can be seen from
Table 1, there are ﬁve countries which have episodes of high and low inﬂation. With one
exception, the correlation between output and interest rates is higher in the low inﬂation
episode than in the high inﬂation episodes. Table 1 also reports the average value of the
correlation between output and the interest rate for all countries in low inﬂation episodes
a n di nh i g hi n ﬂation episodes. Again, the correlation is higher in low inﬂation episodes than
in high inﬂation episodes.
24Table 1: Evidence from High Inﬂation Economies
Country Low Inﬂation High Inﬂation Period of Period of
ρ(y,R) mean, R ρ(y,R) mean, R Low Inﬂation High Inﬂation
Argentina −0.43 8.15 -0.57 923928.26 1992 - 2000 1980 - 1991
Brazil −0.09 21.39 0.02 2362.59 1963 - 1980 1981 - 1995
Brazil -0.82 25.16 NA NA 1996 - 2000 NA
Chile −0.12 25.85 -0.62 73.89 1984 - 2000 1977 - 1983
Israel 0.57 21.93 -0.68 245.70 1972 - 2000 1979 - 1987
Peru 0.44 28.78 -0.57 846.35 1995 - 2000 1986 - 1994
Turkey NA NA -0.45 68.15 NA 1987 - 2000
Uruguay NA NA −0.36 88.10 NA 1976 - 2000
Column mean -0.08 21.88 −0.46 132516.15 NA NA
I nT a b l e2 ,w er e p o r to nac o m p a r i s o no ft h ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e no u t p u ta n dt h ei n t e r e s t
r a t eb e t w e e nh i g ha n dl o wi n ﬂation countries. In each case, we use the entire available time
series to compute the correlation. As can be seen from this table, the average value of this
correlation is negative for high inﬂation countries and it is marginally positive for the low
inﬂation countries.
25Table 2: Evidence from High and Low Inﬂation Economies
Country ρ(y,R) mean, R Sample Period
Argentina −0.59 527962.50 1980 - 2000
Brazil 0.03 946.05 1963 - 2000
Chile −0.36 39.86 1977 - 2000
Israel −0.24 113.47 1979 - 2000
Peru −0.46 519.32 1979 - 1993
Turkey −0.41 68.15 1987 - 2000
Uruguay −0.30 88.10 1976 - 2000
USA 0.20 6.15 1955 - 2000
Austria 0.48 6.09 1967 - 1998
Belgium 0.32 5.22 1953 - 1998
Denmark −0.31 9.81 1972 - 2000
Finland 0.18 9.68 1978 - 2000
Ireland 0.15 10.65 1971 - 1999
France 0.09 6.96 1950 - 1998
Germany 0.54 5.38 1960 - 2000
Italy 0.09 11.28 1969 - 2000
Japan 0.24 6.21 1957 - 2000
Netherlands −0.04 5.79 1960 - 1998
New Zealand 0.48 11.11 1985 - 2000
Spain 0.33 11.60 1974 - 2000
Sweden 0.01 8.75 1966 - 2000
Switzerland 0.43 3.40 1969 - 2000
United Kingdom 0.03 7.78 1969 - 2000
Canada 0.40 8.36 1975 - 2000
Mean, High Inﬂation -0.33 (-0.29) 75676.78 NA
Mean, Low Inﬂation 0.21 ( 0.21) 7.90 NA
26We also computed the standard deviation of output and interest rates in the various
countries. For the sample of countries in Table 1, we found that σy =0 .0234 and σy =0 .0457
in low and high inﬂation episodes, respectively. Here, σy is the sample standard deviation
of logged and then Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered data, averaged across all episodes. We also
found that σR =3 .57 and σR = 350900,in low and high inﬂation episodes, respectively.
Here, σR is the sample standard deviation in the interest rate averaged across episodes.
Thus, output volatility is a little higher, but interest rate volatility is hugely higher in high
inﬂation episodes.
We turn now to the volatility of the variables in Table 2. There, we ﬁnd σy =0 .0232
and σy =0 .0443 for low and high inﬂation countries, respectively. We ﬁnd σR =1 .8535 and
σR = 283320 f o rl o wa n dh i g hi n ﬂation countries, respectively. These ﬁndings are consistent
with the ones reported in Table 1.
We then simulated 500 artiﬁcial observations from our model. The mean levels of the
government consumption shock, the technology shock, and the money demand shock are
0.05, 1, 0.2 respectively. The autocorrelations of the government consumption shock, the
technology shock and the money demand shock are 0.9 each, while the standard deviations
of the innovations are 0.001, 0.05, 0.0005 respectively. We ﬁltered the artiﬁcial data from
t h em o d e li nt h es a m ew a yt h a tt h ea c t u a ld a t aw e r eﬁltered. We found that σy =0 .017 in
both high and low inﬂation equilibria, while σR =0 .007 and σR =0 .065 in the low and high
inﬂation equilibria, respectively. The model obviously fails to match the level of volatility
in these variables in the data. However, it is interesting that the model predicts the interest
rate is an order of magnitude more volatile in the high inﬂation equilibrium, which output
volatility is essentially the same. We also computed the correlation between logged and
ﬁltered output and the ﬁltered interest rate. That correlation is 0.731 in the low inﬂation
equilibrium and −0.733 in the high inﬂation equilibrium.
We interpret the results for correlations and relative volatility across high and low inﬂa-
tion equilibria as providing modest support for the model.
V Stability of High and Low Inﬂation Equilibria Under
Learning
In the previous section we identiﬁed two Markov equilibria for our model. Here, we ask
whether simple learning mechanisms could be used to rule out one of these equilibria. A
variety of learning schemes could be examined. For example, the government might learn
about some feature of the private economy or private agents may be uncertain about the
government’s policy. Our environment is suﬃciently simple that a variety of such learning
environments can be considered. Here, we consider the case in which households learn about
government policy.
When households determine the period t payments technology, zt, they have to form a
guess about monetary policy. Here, we assume that they guess monetary policy will produce
an interest rate equal to the one that was realized in the previous period, Rt−1. As before,
their decision is made after the realization of the period t shocks. So, zt is the value of z
27implied by (27) when R is replaced by Rt−1. The monetary authority’s response function is
what it was before, taking zt as input and generating Rt as output. It is deﬁned by Uq =0
in (24).
The dynamics of the deterministic version of the economy are displayed in Figure 8.
Recall that for every zt there are two monetary policy responses. The results in the ﬁgure
suggest that only the lower one is consistent with equilibrium under learning. The high rate
of interest produced by jumping to the upper branch produces such a low value of z in the
next period that there is not equilibrium then for the model with ﬁxed exogenous payments
technology. Now, suppose that the monetary authority’s response selects the lower of the
two values of R. Then, we see that only the low inﬂation equilibrium is stable under learning.
The high inﬂation equilibrium is not.






















Monetary authority's response, R       t,
given the payment technology, z       t
Private sector's response, z        t,
given anticipated monetary policy, R        t-1
Figure 8: Equilibria Under Learning
VI Conclusion
The results in this paper show that absence of commitment in monetary policy is in principle
capable of rationalizing a high inﬂation bias, as well as prolonged periods of low and high
inﬂation. This work is preliminary. We have provided only modest initial evidence of support
for the model from the data. In addition, learning considerations need to be studied further
before concluding that all the multiple Markov equilibria for the model are ‘reasonable’.
28A Appendix 1:
This appendix derives various results used in section B. For later reference, it is useful to
know that when utility is given by (??), then (14) reduce to:
c12 = c11q
−1















Incorporating these results into the cash in advance constraint gives:
c11
n







We now develop formulas for cq and nq. Consider ﬁrst cq.D i ﬀerentiating (2), and evalu-











(1 − z)[µc21,q +( 1− µ)c22,q], (30)
where cij,q is the derivative of cij with respect to q. From the resource constraint, we obtain:
nq =
z [µc11,q +( 1− µ)c12,q]+( 1− z)[µc21,q +( 1− µ)c22,q]
θ
. (31)







































,c 12,q = −c1




µc11,q +( 1− µ)c12,q = −c1(1 − µ). (35)










Second, we show that ψMD(0) > 0. Third, we show that Uq↓1 is identical to (22). Fourth,
we show that Uq↑1 is strictly positive.
29A First result
To establish the ﬁrst result, we begin by diﬀerentiating (28) to obtain,




Combining this and (35) with (31), we obtain:
(1 − ρ)θ
c2














To get c21,q we work with the labor ﬁrst order condition in (28), after substituting out for
θn from (16) and for c using (2) and for c12 and c22 from (28) to obtain:
θ = g +[ zc11 +( 1− z)c21]
h




















































































Substituting (39) into (37) it is easily veriﬁed that nq is of the desired form.
BS e c o n d R e s u l t
To verify ψMD(0) > 0, it is suﬃcient to establish that the expression in square brackets in














(1 − z)(1 + ψ)+
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1 − µ +
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This establishes the desired result.
30CT h i r d R e s u l t
To establish the third result, it suﬃces to establish that the interest rate is increasing in q
at the point c1/c2 =1 . That is, since R =( c22/c12)1−ρ, we need c21,q ≥ c11,q at the point
c21 = c11 = c22 = c12 = c. Substituting for c21,q from (38), we need to show that



















































1 − µ +
ψ
ρ
(1 − ρµ) ≥ (1 − µ)ρ(1 + ψ)+( 1− µ)ψ(1 − ρ).













≥ ρ + ψ.
Since ρ ≤ 1 and (1 − ρµ)/[ρ(1 − µ)] = (1/ρ − µ)/(1 − µ) ≥ 1, we have the desired result.
DF o u r t h R e s u l t
T oo b t a i nt h ef o u r t hr e s u l t ,w ec a ns e ef r o m( 3 3 )t h a t ,s i n c et h eﬁrst term is zero and the
term in square brackets is positive, the result follows if nq > 0. We establish this result here.
Inspecting (30) and (31), and evaluating the derivatives at c1 = c2 = c, it follows that
cq = θnq.
From (28), we have
c12,q = c11,q −
c
1 − ρ
,c 22,q = c21,q −
c
1 − ρ
31Totally diﬀerentiating the equation, R =1 , i.e., c22 = c12, we obtain c22,q = c12,q. Using this
result in the previous equation, we obtain
c11,q = c21,q.
Using these results in (30), we obtain
cq = µc11,q +( 1− µ)c12,q,
or




Next, totally diﬀerentiating the labor ﬁrst order condition in (28) and using cq = θnq and














Since nq = cq/θ, the desired result follows.
B Appendix 2: Model With Inelastic Money Demand
In the previous analysis, we found that the equilibria of our model depend upon the elasticity
of substitution in utility between cash and credit goods. In that model, this is the same as
the elasticity of demand faced by suppliers. To ensure that their proﬁtf u n c t i o ni sb o u n d e d
above, it is necessary that that elasticity be no less than unity. To understand the robustness
of our results to situations in which the elasticity of substitution between cash and credit
goods is low, we break the link between the elasticity of demand faced by suppliers and
the elasticity of substitution between cash and credit goods. We do this by modifying the
household’s utility function. The market structure of the ﬁrm sector, and ﬁrm technology
remain the same. In addition, the sequence of events in the period is also unchanged. That
is, at the beginning of the period a fraction of ﬁrms set their prices. Then, the monetary
authority selects its action. Finally, the remaining prices and quantities for the period are
determined in a private sector equilibrium. We abstract from uncertainty in this section.
32AF i r m s
The ﬁrm sector is essentially identical to what it was before. There is a continuum of goods.
Each good is produced by a monopolist who faces a demand curve with elasticity denoted
here by 1/(1 − λ), where 0 < λ < 1. Some ﬁrms (‘sticky price ﬁrms’) set prices before the
monetary authority takes it current period action, and other ﬁrms (‘ﬂexible price ﬁrms’) set
their price afterward. All ﬁrms operate competitively in homogeneous factor markets. As









where the state s now consists only of the price set by the sticky price ﬁrms, Pe. With one
exception, all the notation is the same as before. The exception is that ρ has been replaced
by λ.
BH o u s e h o l d s
Preferences are as in (1), with
c =[ zc
ρ





















The individual goods, ci(x),x∈ (0,1),i=1 ,2, are produced by the ﬁrms discussed in the
previous section.




eµ1c11 + ˆ P(s,x)(1− µ1)c12
i
≥ 0, (44)
where c1i denotes consumption of the sticky price cash goods when i =1and of the ﬂexible
price cash goods when i =2(c2i is the corresponding notation for credit goods.)15 Also, µ1
denotes the fraction of cash goods whose prices are sticky (µ2 is the corresponding fraction
sticky price credit goods).
As before, the household begins the period with nominal assets, A. It then goes to the
asset market where it faces constraint, (4). The household’s nominal assets evolve as follows:
xA









eµ2c21 + ˆ P(s,x)(1 − µ2)c22
i
,
where W, R, D and x a r ea sd e ﬁned before.
33The household problem is formally identical to (7), with (6) replaced by (45), (5) replaced























As before, the solution to the household’s problem yields decision rules of the form, n(A,s,x),
M(A,s,x),A 0(A,s,x), and cij(A,s,x),i ,j=1 ,2.
Note how our speciﬁcation of the household problem disentangles the elasticity of sub-
stitution between cash and credit goods, c1 and c2, from the elasticity of demand for the
individual goods, ci(x), i =1 ,2,x∈ (0,1).
C Markov Equilibrium
Our deﬁnition of a Markov equilibrium coincides with the deﬁnition given in the previous
section, with the obvious modiﬁcations. For example the labor market clearing condition is:
n(1,s,x)=µ1c11 +( 1− µ1)c12 + µ2c21 +( 1− µ2)c22,
where cij is as previously deﬁned.
DC h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n
This section displays the qualitative properties of the Markov equilibrium of our economy.
We proceed as in section on the benchmark model. In particular, we ﬁrst derive the equations
which characterize a Markov equilibrium. For this, we need to ﬁrst construct the private
sector allocation rule, the mapping from government policies to the prices and quantities
that deﬁne a private sector equilibrium. We then need to express the ﬁrst order conditions
for the monetary authority, who optimizes subject to the private sector allocation rule. In
the second section we use our equations to characterize the set of Markov equilibria for the
model.
D.1 Private Allocations and Prices
The monetary authority’s action, x, is taken at a time when Pe is known. The private sector
prices and quantities to be determined are cij,i=1 ,2,q ,n ,w ,R ,where q = ˆ P/Pe. As
before, we ﬁnd it convenient to think of the government’s policy variable as q instead of x.
So, we compute cij,i=1 ,2,n ,w ,Ras a function of q and Pe.
We proceed now to pin down the seven unknowns, cij,i=1 ,2,n ,w ,R ,conditional on
q and Pe. For this, we use 7 equations that characterize the equilibrium. As before, the 7
equations depend upon whether or not the cash in advance constraint is binding.
The resource constraint is:
g + µ1c11 +( 1− µ1)c12 + µ2c21 +( 1− µ2)c22 = n. (47)
























(1 − n)(1− z)
. (51)
The cash in advance constraint is given by:
P
eµ1c11 + qP
e(1 − µ1)c12 ≤ 1. (52)











As before, we use these equations to deﬁne the private sector allocation rules, cij(Pe,q),
i =1 ,2,R (Pe,q),n (Pe,q).
D.2 Government Problem
















The function, q(Pe), is the monetary authority’s best response, given Pe. Equilibrium re-
quires that q(Pe)=1 . This equilibrium requirement allows us to construct the equilibrium
price, Pe.
35D.3 Qualitative Characteristics of Markov Equilibria
As in section B, we begin by considering equilibria which satisfy R>1. In this case, the
allocation rules are diﬀerentiable and Uq is given by
Uq = uccq + unnq





nq,w eo b t a i n
Uq = uc
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(1 − z)[µ2c21,q +( 1− µ2)c22,q],
which is just (30). We now derive nq, by diﬀerentiating (47):
nq = µ1c11,q +( 1− µ1)c12,q + µ2c21,q +( 1− µ2)c22,q. (55)
Substituting out for cq and nq in the ﬁrst set of square brackets in (54), we obtain:




















Using the expression for the interest rate, (50), we obtain:














Diﬀerentiating (52) with respect to q, and evaluating the result at q =1:
µ1c11,q +( 1− µ1)c12,q = −(1 − µ1)c1. (56)
Substituting this into the preceding expression, we obtain:





(R − 1)c1(1 − µ1) (57)
+
"






36Notice that this expression is essentially the same as the corresponding expression, (22), in
the benchmark model. In this case, however, it is no longer true that the ﬁrst term in (57)









































When ρ > 0, it is possible to use exactly the same kind of argument used in the previ-
ous section to demonstrate that there are at least two Markov equilibria. When ρ < 0,
ψID(c1/c2) →∞as c1/c2 → 0. When ρ =0 , ψID converges to a constant as c1/c2 → 0.
Therefore, in these cases, it is not possible to use the same argument as earlier to demonstrate
multiplicity of equilibria.
Indeed, in the log case (ρ =0 ), for certain values of the model parameters, it is possible
to provide an analytical expression for the best response. This expression shows that there
is a unique equilibrium, which also yields the outcome, R =1 . We have also constructed
robust numerical examples in which it appears that the Markov equilibrium is unique.
To summarize, a key result of the two previous sections is that the issue of multiplicity of
equilibria turns on the elasticity of money demand at very high rates of inﬂation. Speciﬁcally,





In both economies, c1 is proportional to M/P, a n dw h e ni n ﬂation rates are high, c2 is approx-
imately proportional to aggregate consumption. Thus, the multiplicity of equilibria depends
on the behavior of (R−1)M/(Pc) at high inﬂation rates. This expression is equivalent in a
sense to the magnitude of the inﬂation tax, where the net nominal interest rate is interpreted
as the tax rate and the base, of course, is the stock of real balances. One interpretation of
our results is that if these inﬂation tax revenues go to zero, as inﬂation goes to inﬁnity, there
are necessarily multiple equilibria, while if the inﬂation tax revenues do not go to zero, there
are often unique equilibria.
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39Notes
1Our model formalizes the idea in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and in Barro and Gordon
(1983) that an unanticipated monetary expansion raises output and can raise welfare. For
models and evidence on the eﬀects of inﬂation on relative allocations, see Cukierman (1983),
Parks (1978), and Vining and Elwertowski (1976).
2See Aiyagari, Braun and Eckstein (1998), Cole and Stockman (1992), Dotsey and Ireland
( ), Freeman and Kydland (1994), Ireland (1994), Lacker and Schreft (1996), and Schreft
(1992) for similar models of ﬁnancial intermediation.
3Of the ﬁrst four ﬁrst order conditions in the ﬁrst two lines of (14), only three are
independent.
4This must be established rigorously.
5In practice, we obtain the functions in (18) and determine D as follows. For given s,
Pe,q ,we ﬁrst solve (14), (16) and the cash in advance constraint as a strict equality for cij,
i,j =1 ,2,n ,x ,R .If R computed in this way satisﬁes R ≥ 1, then q, Pe ∈ D. If R violates
R ≥ 1 we resolve the system, replacing the cash in advance constraint by R =1 , i.e., u11/u21
= u12/u22 = z/(1 − z). If the cash in advance constraint is satisﬁed for the resulting values
of cij,i ,j=1 ,2,n ,x ,then q, Pe ∈ D. If not, then q, Pe / ∈ D.
6We will discuss why we need not be concerned with the case in which this derivative is
diﬀerent from zero at an optimum. A remark about diﬀerentiability will be added here.
7For details, see an earlier footnote.
8The estimation period is 1970Q1 to 1997Q1. For our monetary aggregate, we used M1
(FM1) and for our output measure we used GDP (GDP) (Citibase Mnemonics appear in
parentheses). For the interest rate, we used the three-month Treasury bill rate (FYGM3).
409Parks (1978) reports that a one percentage point rise in aggregate inﬂation is associated
with a rise in the variance of the log of relative prices of 0.015. Consider a version of this
model in which the money stock is stochastic and growth rates of money are i.i.d. over time.
In this version it is easy to show that a 1% rise in inﬂation relative to its steady state value
is associated with an increase in the variance of relative prices of µ(1−µ) suggesting a value
of µ of roughly 0.017.
10To verify that suﬃcient conditions for an optimum are satisﬁed, we proceeded as follows.
Corresponding to each of the two candidate equillibria, there is a value of Pe. For each Pe
we examined the graph of U(s,Pe,q) for a wide range of values of q. In each case, we veriﬁed
that q =1is the global maximum.
11For each z and c1/c2 that set Uq =0 , we computed a candidate Markov equilibrium. We
then veriﬁed that that candidate equilibrium is an actual equilibrium by conﬁrming that it
is consistent with monetary authority maximization. To compute the candidate equilibrium,
we combined the optimization conditions for ﬁrms with the household ﬁrst order condition
for labor, to obtain an expression that relates z and c1/c2 to n :
θ
"
1 − n −











The levels of c1 and c2 can then be computed from the resource constraint, θn = g +
zc1 +( 1− z)c2. Finally, P is found using the cash in advance constraint, Pzc 1 =1 . Setting
Pe =1 /(zc1), we then considered the private sector equilibria associated with a range of ˆ P
about Pe to verify that period utility is maximized at ˆ P = Pe.
















Substituting this into the resource constraint, taking into account cρ = zc
ρ
























14T h es m o o t h n e s sp a r a m e t e ri nt h eH Pﬁlter was set to 100.
15As in the previous section, concavity of the utility function guarantees that households
optimally choose to consume all sticky price cash goods at the same rate, and similarly for
the ﬂe x i b l ep r i c ec a s hg o o d sa n dt h es t i c k ya n dﬂexible price credit goods.
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